The tax evasion behaviors of above-ground and underground economic activities differ. Above-ground economy tax evasion refers to people engaging in government sanctioned production and consumer activities and circumventing the payment of taxes mandated by law. The underground economy refers to people engaging in economic activities that are not sanctioned by the government, which is also known as the "grey economy." The main objective of engaging in underground economic activity is to avoid taxation by tax agencies. To explore the relationship between taxpayers' underground economic income reporting and tax compliance rates, this study established a utility function that included both the above-ground and underground economies, and divided public goods based on their above-ground and underground economic weight. This study analyzed taxpayers' underground economic income by adopting the probability of penalization and identifying the optimal participation rate. This study also found that taxpayers' corresponding risk aversion attitudes after becoming wealthy, or experiencing increased income, was a key factor of whether increases in the tax rate generated increases in the ratio of the underground economy labor force.
<1 represents the decline in the marginal tax rate as n y increases (See Appendix 1). In addition, there are no guarantees that the representative taxpayers will not avoid paying taxes on their above-ground income. For example, taxpayers can underreport their salary or spread the interest on their income into different income reporting periods (years) to circumvent taxes. E represents taxpayers' combined above-ground and underground income budget constraints. The above-ground income ( n y ) price is n P =1. Because no taxes are paid on underground income u y , this study set the underground income ( u y 
Equation (5a) shows the reported ratio  of above-ground income of the representative taxpayers to their total income, which is inversely proportional to the representative taxpayers' underground income coefficient value  . When the above-ground income tax rate m increased, the percentage of the representative taxpayers'  and 0.3  m , the tax compliance rate  is 
Analysis of the relationship between the changing Eq.(7) (Note 6) parameter and representative taxpayers' above-ground total income reporting rate  was conducted as follows: , the value of above-ground income is 0, and all the representative taxpayers' income has been converted into underground income. This is the worst tax base erosion situation. In this situation, the tax compliance rate is  >0 and equal to the representative taxpayers' above-ground income coefficient value  . . However, this outcome is subject to the following prerequisite condition (Note 8):
Equation (8) shows that as the above-ground income tax rate reduced the effective tax rate after the considered tax compliance rate increased. The prerequisite for , the above-ground income tax rate m decreased because representative taxpayers' tax compliance rate  increased, thereby increasing the effective tax rate e r . This finding assumes that regardless of whether the tax evasion behaviors of representative taxpayers are discovered, the concealed cost is 0. If
Simultaneously, Eq. (3) can be revised as
This does not alter the results derived from Eq. (4) to (8). Considering that the concealed cost paid by taxpayers exceeds 0, the prerequisite of increases in the effective tax rate integrated with the tax compliance rate must still satisfy
Concealed Costs and Underground Economic Income
To investigate how concealed costs affect representative taxpayers' underground income level, this study further investigated how representative taxpayers' unreported income and concealed costs affected the results of Eqs. (4) to (8). Referencing relevant definitions of concealed cost parameters established by Chen (2003) (Note 9) , this study revised the expression of concealed cost as (Note 10)
(e h is the above-ground income concealed cost rate of representative taxpayers, and e is the unreported ratio of the representative taxpayers' above-ground income n y , assuming that (1   , the higher the underground income concealment costs 1 h . The 1 h in this case exhibits a secondary titration correlation; that is,
. When the concealed cost parameter is substituted into Eq. (1), the following can be obtained Vol. 9, No. 10; Under income budget constraints, the first-order condition process included in the above equation (Lagrangian expression) to obtain the n y of the representative taxpayers is as follows:
Further analysis show that
Equation (9a) shows that the higher the representative taxpayers' above-ground income concealment cost 2 0 ) (e h , the higher the representative taxpayers' above-ground income n y . This implies that the higher the tax evasion costs, the lower the representative taxpayers' incentives to evade taxes. Similarly, the optimal first-order processing conditions for u y are as follows:
Further analysis shows that
. Equation (9c) 
Equation (9d) is the underground income change multiplier caused by changes in the above-ground income tax rate. According to Eq. (9d), regardless of whether the costs of concealing representative taxpayers' underground income are considered, increases in the above-ground income tax rate increase the underground income of representative taxpayers. does not change in the short-term, the higher the above-ground income tax rate m , the higher the u y . This indicates that as the above-ground income tax rate increases, the incentive for representative taxpayers to evade above-ground income tax also increases, increasing their underground income u y .
In addition, when 
Adding the Effects that Public Goods Have on Underground Economic Income
Public goods exist in a practical economic society. The study temporarily discounted consumer public goods and whether an equal allocation of productive public goods exists in the underground and above-ground economy, www.ccsenet.org/ass Asian Social Science Vol. 9, No. 10; 2013 6 and added productive public goods into the tax model to explore its effect on representative taxpayers' underground income and utility. Assuming that the population in an economic society has a fixed short-term growth rate of assumes that the representative taxpayers invest capital K into both above-ground and underground production sectors. This differs significantly from general underground economy models because underground economic laborers (e.g., such as illegal workers or immigrants) worry about receiving a fine or having to pay taxes, or even being deported, if discovered by the government. This causes underground laborers to avoid using productive public goods as above-ground economic laborers. Therefore, this economic taxes model establishes the difference between the productive public goods provided by the government for above-ground and underground economic sectors. In this study, the above-ground production sectors' public goods are denoted as p G (Note 12). Practically, the p G received by the underground production sector should be less than the p G received by the above-ground sectors. This study also set b as the ratio of production-type public goods received by underground economic sectors to the quantity of productive-type public goods received by the above-ground economic sector (0<b<1). When excessive numbers of taxpayers use productive-type public goods for production, congestion effects similar to club goods can result. This reduces the amount of productive-type public goods that can be employed by each representative taxpayer. If 1-s is the ratio of labor capital invested by representative taxpayers (k units) into the above-ground economic sector for production, s is the ratio of labor capital invested into the underground economic sector for production, ) N (  is the number of representative taxpayers who use public goods in the economic society, A is the production technology (A > 0),
is the representative taxpayers' original production function, and k represents the labor capital per sector in k=K/N, then the production function can be changed to
,and assuming Inada conditions were established, then
. (Note 13) Referencing Barro (1990) regarding the AK production function pattern, (Note 14) this study revised and obtained the representative taxpayers' above-ground and underground income production functions, as shown in Eqs. (11) and (11a).
1) Representative taxpayers' above-ground income
Representative taxpayers' underground income
Therefore, the representative taxpayers' above-ground post-tax production income can be expressed as
m represents the government's effective tax rate for above-ground income,  is the penalty rate,
is the probability of the above-ground income not being exposed, n q is the probability of the above-ground income being exposed, e is the unreported ratio of the representative taxpayers' above-ground economy,
is the concealed cost of the representative taxpayers' above-ground income (
, and e is the multiplier of 0 h . Similarly, the representative taxpayers' underground production income can be expressed as www.ccsenet.org/ass Asian Social Science Vol. 9, No. 10; 2013
, which denotes the government's effective tax rate of underground income. In Eq. (11c), 2 1 ) 1
is the concealed cost of the representative taxpayers' underground income.
According to
into Eq. (11) and the
of (11a) into Eqs. (11b) and (11c), this study obtained Eqs. (11d) and (11e) as follows:
From the government's fiscal balance perspective, the government's tax revenue and fines for representative taxpayers' above-ground and underground income equals the government subsidy ic g , which is the average cost that the government incurs to audit each taxpayer's above-ground and underground income for tax evasion. This can be expressed as Eq. (12): (12) represents the government's technical manpower when investigating tax evasion, and  is the marginal cost per unit of technical manpower. When   0,
separately represent the manpower invested by the government into investigating above-ground and underground income tax evasion. When the government's investigation costs are positively correlated with representative taxpayers' probability of discovery ( n q and u q ), ic g represents the government subsidy that each person can receive.
This study assumes that less public goods are allocated to earning underground economic income compared to that for earning above-ground economic income. If
According to Eq.(5b),
, the public goods allocated to representative taxpayers' underground economic income is less than that allocated to their above-ground economic income. If b and n u u y y y  exhibit a fixed ratio (Note 15), by conducting first-order processing of the capital goods in the above-ground economic sector in Eq. (11d) and the underground economic sector in Eq. (11e), the following can be obtained:
In a situation where the above-ground and underground economic sectors' capital investment rate of return is equal, then Eq. (13) 
When public goods are included, and assuming that the depreciation in capital investment  is not zero, the change in representative taxpayers' above-ground income capital accumulation can be obtained using Eq. (13d).
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The c in Eq. (13d) is the representative taxpayers' consumption level, and the k n r is the representative taxpayers' above-ground post-tax capital rate of return. (Note 17) Similarly, the change in representative taxpayers' underground capital accumulation can be expressed as Eq. (13e).
is the representative taxpayers' underground post-tax capital rate of return. Because the effective tax rate of underground income in Eq. (11c) is
, if the government wishes to reduce the underground economic sectors' capital accumulation, it can attempt to achieve
. This means that the post-tax capital rate of return of the market's capital investment in underground economic sector is less than the capital depreciation rate  . (Note 19)
The Effects that the Income Tax Rate Has on Above-Ground and Underground Economic Consumption
Except for Propositions 1 and 2 mentioned previously, this study further established a closed economic system, where numerous representative taxpayers of the same characteristics exist. Each representative taxpayer pursues the goal of lifelong utility maximization. When the depreciation in capital goods  is not zero, the representative taxpayers' above-ground income utility is (Note 20)
Assuming that consumer public goods 0  c G , then p G and the tax rate m are exogenous. The Hamiltonian optimal control function shows the utility function pattern as follows: 
The corresponding equilibrium condition of the planned problem is as follows: (Note 21)
The unreported tax ratio of the representative taxpayers' above-ground income is t e . Equation (14c) shows that the optimal income reporting rate for the representative taxpayers' above-ground income is
Equation (14d) shows an increase in the above-ground income tax rate m , which reduces the representative taxpayers' above-ground income reporting rate. Increases in the penalty rate  also increases representative taxpayers' above-ground income underreporting rate t e . The effect that increased probability n q (the probability of representative taxpayers' above-ground income being exposed) has on the underreporting rate t e of representative taxpayers' above-ground income is uncertain. leads to a decline in the long-term economic growth rate. Adopting a similar reasoning, an increase in the government's income tax rate related to Proposition 3 influences representative taxpayers' underground economic consumption growth rate. Proposition 3: The premise for an increase in the government's income tax rate reducing representative taxpayers' underground economic consumption growth rate is:
Inference 3: Similar to the previous assumption, the utility of representative taxpayers' underground sector income is
The Hamiltonian optimal control function indicates that the utility function pattern can be expressed as follows:
The corresponding equilibrium condition of the planned problem is shown below.
Similarly, obtaining the ln logarithm from Eq. (15b), and conducting first-order processing of the time produces . After substituting it into Eq. (15c), and adding the underground economy public goods, the long-term growth rate for the underground income consumption of representative taxpayers can be obtained using
Equation (15e) shows that the premises 
Illegal Concealment and the Optimal Reporting Ratio
This study further investigated the relationship between the illegal concealment of representative taxpayers and the optimal reporting ratio, assuming that the government taxation of taxpayers spans more than one period, which agrees with conventional hypotheses. The probability of representative taxpayers being audited during this period is e t q , and the probability of being audited in the following period is e t q 1  . Regardless of whether representative taxpayers face the probability of their tax evasion behaviors being exposed, if the government tax agencies use "evaded income" as the punishment for tax evasion, then the parameters are as previously defined. Representative taxpayers' expenditure function C is minimized and can be expressed as 
The  in Eq. (16) represents the probability of representative taxpayers' illegal concealment being discovered under the "evaded income" audit and punishment method. Thus, the definition of the symbol is the same as previously explained. The above-ground and underground income concealment cost for representative taxpayers is ) (s H .
Proposition 4: If (a) taxpayers' tax burden exceeds one period; (b) more taxpayers evade tax in a given period, which reduces the probability of exposing a representative taxpayer for tax evasion; (c) representative taxpayers successfully conceal their actual income, and when audited, their tax evasion is not discovered; (d) the underground income is
, and assuming that in the above conditions the government uses "evaded income" as the method of punishment, the optimal probability of discovering representative taxpayers' illegal concealment is 
then by conducting first-order processing of the above equation
can obtain represents the tax rate ratio of the total tax rate and penalty rate. represents the probability of the government auditing tax evasion during the t and t+1 periods. If the representative taxpayers' optimal reporting rate for above-ground income is   e 1 , then the relationship between  and t  can be analyzed as follows:
If the probability  of representative taxpayers' illegal concealments being discovered is less than the optimal probability t  of concealed income being discovered, all representative taxpayers will evade taxes. At this time, 1  e .
2)
This means that when the probability  of representative taxpayers' illegal concealment being discovered equals the optimal probability t  of illegal concealments being discovered, some representative taxpayers will evade taxes. At this time,
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This means that if the probability  of representative taxpayers' illegal concealment being discovered exceeds the optimal probability t  of concealed income being discovered, representative taxpayers will not evade taxes. At this time, 0  e .
Analysis of the Underground Income and Utility of Representative Taxpayers
This study further investigated the effects that choosing to evade or not to evade taxes has on utility when representative taxpayers face the probability of being punished for tax evasion behaviors. The model employed in this study referenced the research of Trandel and Snow (1999) (Note 24) and assumed that the fixed marginal tax rate was 0  m . When the income of representative taxpayers is lower than the threshold b (b > n y ), they are not only exempt from taxes, but also qualify for government subsidies m b  . This is equivalent to negative income tax. Referencing the evadable sector and non-evadable sector concept proposed by Watson (1985) (Note 25) and assuming that the income taxes for the above-ground economic sector n y are not evaded, and that the income taxes of the underground economic sector u y are completely evaded, the income of the two sectors is determined by the ratio of labor allocated to the two sectors. The model developed by Watson (1985) uses unreported income as the punishment. As explained in this section, this study referenced the model established by Jung (Note 26) (1994), which employs the amount of tax representative taxpayers have evaded as the punishment, and temporarily did not employ representative taxpayers' illegal concealment as the criteria for punishment. Assuming that representative taxpayers choose not to tax evade in the above-ground economic sector, then their income is n y and the income underreporting rate is 0  e . However, if taxpayers choose to completely evade taxes for underground income, then their income is e y .The penalty rate is the same as the previous  , and ) (s H is the concealed cost regardless of whether the representative taxpayers' tax evasion behavior is discovered. Therefore, when laborers choose to evade taxes in the underground economic sector, the probability (either of being discovered or remaining undiscovered) and the expected utility equals the confirmed utility of the above-ground economic sector when not evading taxes.
If the utility of representative taxpayers choosing to report above-ground economic sector income is
(Note 27), this conforms to the real-world economic situation. The difference between this study's model and the model developed by Trandel and Snow (1999) is that this study assumes that all the representative taxpayers evaded taxes on their underground economic sector income. If they are not discovered, they are not required to pay taxes and will not be punished. At this time, underground income is no longer , and assuming that the representative taxpayers' underground economy tax evasion behavior is unrelated to government subsidies, then the expected utility of all the representative taxpayers' underground economic sector tax evasion (discovered or undiscovered) can be rewritten as
is Neuman-Morgenstrn's expected utility function. Assuming that an interior solution exists and that  a is the underground economic sector laborer population ratio, the laborers will reach equal expected utility in the underground and above-ground economic sector if
, a is the ratio of laborers in the tax evasion sector, By separately calculating the effects that the probability q (being discovered) and changes in tax rate m of representative taxpayers have on the ratio of underground economic laborers  a , the following was obtained by employing implicit function theorem to Eq.(18a): 
 . When tax rates change, and assuming that the representative taxpayers' reduced marginal utility of the above-ground sector exceeds the representative taxpayers' reduced value of mean expected marginal utility in the underground sector, rises in the tax rate increase the ratio of underground laborers  a . In addition, the probability of tax evasion being discovered by the government, and its effect on the ratio of underground laborers is 0
. If the utility value for the probability of tax evasion being discovered and the utility value for the probability of tax evasion remaining undiscovered is negative, then
Equation (18d) shows that an increase in the probability q of tax evasion being discovered by the government reduces the ratio of underground laborers.
In addition, an increase in the concealed cost ) (s H of representative taxpayers' tax evasion investment prompts representative taxpayers to shift from an "advantageous situation when tax evasion is undiscovered" to a "disadvantageous situation when tax evasion is discovered" (See Appendix 2).
Lemma: Increases in the tax rate increase, have no effect, or reduce the population of underground laborers. This is related to whether the representative taxpayers' relative risk aversion level increases, remains unchanged, or decreases.
Proof: By using  X to conduct first-order processing of Eq. (18), the following can be obtained:
By multiplying both sides with  X , the following can be obtained:
By multiplying both sides of Eq. (18e) with ) (1 m  , the following can be obtained:
The right side of Eq. (18f) can be expressed as follows:
After organizing Eq. (18f) and Eq. (18g), the following can be obtained:
Assuming that wealth is   W and probability is q  1 , if no representative taxpayers are exposed for underground tax evasion, their wealth is
. When the probability q indicates that all representative taxpayers are exposed for underground tax evasion, their wealth is
Referencing the model developed by Trandel and Snow (1999) , the representative taxpayers' wealth can be expressed as follows:
Referencing Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965) regarding risk compensation,  can be defined as 
By multiplying both sides with W, the following can be obtained:
According to Eq. (18c),
Equation (21) shows that whether increases in the tax rate increase the population of underground laborers primarily depends on the risk aversion attitudes exhibited by representative taxpayers after experiencing a wealth
, then increases in the tax rate increase the population of underground laborers, and vice versa.
Conclusions
The model developed in this study differs from traditional underground economic models because it established a utility function pattern that includes the above-ground and underground economies simultaneously. The above-ground income price was 1 and no taxes were paid for underground income. Thus, the price was m  1 . Considering the government's technical manpower investments for tax evasion audits, this study allocated different weights to public goods based on the above-ground and underground economies. This study also included the concealed costs of the representative taxpayers' unreported above-ground and underground income in the model. The results of this study indicated the following: (a) Theoretically, increases in the above-ground income tax rate enhance the conversion of above-ground income into underground income in an effort to avoid tax. The representative taxpayers' above-ground income reporting coefficient was greater than or equal to their tax compliance rate; (b) regardless of whether the representative taxpayers' costs of concealment exceeded or equaled 0, after integrating it into their tax compliance rate, decreases in the income tax rate increased the effective tax rate because of the representative taxpayers' increased tax compliance rate, which increased the government's tax revenue. (c) Generally, increases in the income tax rate reduce the growth rate of representative taxpayers' long-term above-ground consumption. Only increases in the income tax rate can boost the growth rate of representative taxpayers' long-term underground consumption. This indicates that tax base erosion alters representative taxpayers' long-term above-ground and underground consumption growth patterns. (d) When the government uses "evaded income" to punish tax evasion, the optimal probability of discovering representative taxpayers' illegal concealment was lower than that when the government uses "tax evasion" as the punishment. (e) This study found that an increase in the tax rate increases, has no effect, or reduces the population of underground laborers depending on whether the representative taxpayers' corresponding risk aversion increases, remains unchanged, or decreases. If representative taxpayers' relative risk aversion tends to increase, then increases in the tax rate increase in population of underground laborers, and vice versa. Frederiksen et al. (2005) only considered the fines required when underground income has been discovered. However, most situations still require making up the tax (e.g., still required to pay housing tax and rent income). Therefore, this study integrated make-up underground tax into the model. Note 4. Feige and McGee (1983) used marginal tax rate and average tax rate to express the tax rate progression concept. They asserted that ignoring the progression concept decreases the realistic nature of the model. . That is, increased consumption simultaneously causes above-ground and underground income capital accumulation change to be reduced by the same amount,
is the representative taxpayers' instantaneous utility function (satisfaction when they enjoy consumer capital and public goods).
Note 21.  is the dynamic Lagrange multiplier, indicating the marginal utility of an income increase.
Note 22. Equation (14g) shows that the average long-term above-ground income consumption growth rate c c  is fixed. According to Bruce and Turnovsky (1999) , the long-term average capital economic growth rate in average economic growth equals to the long-term consumption growth rate, which equals long-term economic growth rate Note 24. Trandel and Snow (1999) primarily investigated the relationship between accumulated income tax and underground economic income. Their study indicated that the key in audit ratio's effect toward underground economic activity is the taxpayers' risk aversion utility and the difference in their risk tendencies. Kangoh (2001) indicated that under decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), increasing tax rate leads to higher tax compliance rate. Note 25. Watson primarily divided economy into evadable sector and non-evadable sector. Each laborer can freely choose to work in either sector. The laborers in the evadable sector choose to underreport their actual income to the government. The pre-tax income of the two sectors will eventually be adjusted where the two sector laborers have the same marginal income. Note 26. Jung assumed that taxpayers exist in a Von Neuman-Morgenstern utility pattern, and
which is a concave function pattern. Note 27. Trandel and Snow (1999) set the taxpayers' discovered and undiscovered expected utility for their choice of evadable sector tax evasion as
, which is different than the assumption of this study. , and the first-order condition can be used to obtain the following: 
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